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COMMENTS
PREDICTION OF DANGEROUSNESS AND WASHINGTON'S
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTE
In 1991, responding to public outcry against a string of brutal sex crimes
against women and children by recidivist sex offenders, the Washington state
legislature enacted legislation creating a new civil commitment system.' The
system is designed to identify sex offenders suffering from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder making it likely that they will commit
violent, predatory sex crimes.2 The offender, if found beyond a reasonable
doubt to be a sexually violent predator, will be confined to a high-security
mental health treatment center within the Washington State penal system.
The predator's commitment to the treatment center is indefinite.' The
predator can obtain release if the state is unable to show beyond a reasonable
1. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010-71.09.902 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
2. "'Sexually violent predator' means any person who has been convicted of or charged with
a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence." WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991). "'Mental abnormality' means a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes
the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a
menace to the health and safety of others." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West
1975 & Supp. 1991). "'Predatory' means acts directed towards strangers or individuals with
whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(3) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
"Sexually violent offense" means an act committed on, before, or after July 1, 1990,
that is: (a) An act defined in Title 9A RCW as rape in the first degree, rape in the
second degree by forcible compulsion, rape of a child in the first or second degree,
statutory rape in the first or second degree, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion,
indecent liberties against a child under the age fourteen, incest against a child under
age fourteen, or child molestation in the first or second degree; (b) a felony offense
in effect at any time prior to July 1, 1990, that is comparable to a sexually violent
offense as defined in (a) of this subsection, or any federal or out-of-state conviction
for a felony offense that under the laws of this state would be a sexually violent
offense as defined in this subsection; (c) an act of murder in the first or second
degree, assault in the first or second degree, kidnapping in the first or second degree,
burglary in the first degree, residential burglary, or unlawful imprisonment, which
act, either at the time of sentencing for the offense or subsequently during civil
commitment proceedings pursuant to 71.09 RCW, has been determined beyond a
reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated, as that term is defined in RCW
9.94A.030; or (d) an act as described in chapter 9A.28 RCW, that is an attempt,
criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit one of the felonies designated
in (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(4) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
3. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991). The new treatment
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doubt that he or she is still suffering from the mental illness which caused
him or her to be a sexually violent predator.5
The Sexually Violent Predator law has been severely criticized on
constitutional grounds. Critics allege that it violates procedural and
substantive due process and equal protection.6 The Washington State
Supreme Court has heard a case raising the issue and will render an opinion
by June of 1993.' There are strong indications that the law is constitutional
and will stand.'
Apart from the constitutionality of the statute, one of the most hotly
contested aspects of this commitment scheme is it depends upon the ability
of mental health professionals to predict what the offender is likely to do in
the future. It is fundamental in the law that we do not punish persons for
what they might do. However, the Sexually Violent Predator civil commit-
ment scheme is not a method of punishment. Washington is undertaking to
treat the offender pursuant to its parens patriae power and to protect the
public from "the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill"
pursuant to the state's police power.9 The fact that Washington acknowledg-
es the difficulty of treating this class of offenders does not diminish the
state's interest in treating them, provided the treatment is at least somewhat
effective for the offenders." ° Critics of the statute argue that because the
5. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.090(1), (2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
6. See generally Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System: An Unconstitutional Law and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 105 (1990); John Q. LaFond, Washington State's Unconstitutional Reply to Sex
Predators, SATrLE TIMES, May 30, 1991 at A9.
7. In re Andre Brigham Young and In re Vance Cunningham, 804 P.2d 1261 (Wash. 1991).
8. See generally Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The
Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213 (1991). GIeb asserts the Act will meet constitutional tests
for: civil confinement, proper categorization of offenders as "sexually violent predators,"
procedural due process, equal protection, and adequacy of treatment.
The recent case of Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) indicates that narrowly
drawn statutes addressing confinement of dangerous and mentally ill offenders which contain
high levels of procedural due process will be upheld. Foucha is discussed infra.
See also Supreme Court cases approving the reliance on predictions of dangerousness:
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (upholding constitutionality of a Texas death penalty
statute that allowed a finding of future dangerousness, based on psychiatric testimony, to justify
a death sentence. The adversarial process will "sort out the reliable from the unreliable
evidence" Id. at 901); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (upholding constitutionality of
New York juvenile preventive detention statute and specifically rejecting the contention that it
was impossible to predict future dangerousness, stating that "from a legal point of view there
is nothing unattainable" about such predictions despite the difficulties in reliability of psychiatric
prediction.); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (holding that legislatures have a right
to enact laws regardless of the current state of psychiatric ability to predict, and that such
legislative judgements are to be accorded deference. Id. at 364 n. 13). These cases and others
dealing with psychiatric prediction are discussed below, see text infra part II.
9. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
10. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 provides inter alia that:
In contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment under Chapter 71.05 RCW
[Washington's short term commitment statute], sexually violent predators generally
2
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prediction of dangerousness by psychiatrists and psychologists are unreliable,
they should not be used to separate these predatory sex offenders from the
class of sex offenders in general. Rather than commit the offenders
indefinitely, those who oppose the statute advocate punishing these offenders
with stiffer prison sentences for their crimes." The purpose of this
comment is to explore the uses and purposes of predictions of dangerousness
in the law. This comment will explore the reasons why the use of predic-
tions of dangerousness are constitutional, and argue that the objections to
their use actually rest on moral and ethical grounds.
I. HISTORY OF THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATOR CIVIL COMMITMENT SCHEME
In 1988, Gene Raymond Kane was released from prison to a work
release program in downtown Seattle after serving a thirteen year sentence
for attacking two women. 2 Kane was not treated for his mental problems
while in prison because he was considered "too dangerous to handle." 3
This, however, did not prevent his release into the Seattle community.
On September 26, 1988, Diane Ballasiotes left her downtown Seattle ad
have antisocial personality features which are unamenable to existing mental illness
treatment modalities and those features render them likely to engage in sexually
violent behavior . .. the prognosis for curing sexually violent offenders is poor, the
treatment needs of this population are very long term, and the treatment modalities
for this population are very different than the traditional treatment modalities for
people appropriate for commitment under the involuntary treatment act.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1975 & 1991 Supp.) It is generally accepted that
where a person is civilly committed they have a right to treatment which is reasonably certain
to change the offender's behavior within a reasonable period of time. George E. Dix, Special
Dispositional Alternatives for Abnonnal Offenders, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS 133,
178 (John Monahan and Henry Steadman, eds., 1983). See Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (a person committed under District of Columbia's Sex Offender program only
has a right to reasonably suitable and adequate treatment); State v. Sell, 277 N.W.2d 256 (Neb.
1979) (the right of persons committed as sexual psychopaths, even if essentially untreatable,
have a right to "such care and treatment as is appropriate under the circumstances."). Thus,
sexually violent predators committed under the Washington statute have a right to be treated, but
only to the extent reasonably possible under current methods of treatment for sex offenders.
There is no constitutional requirement that the treatment be guaranteed to be successful.
11. See generally Barry Siegel, Locking Up 'Sexual Predators,' L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990,
at A1-A30, Bodine, supra note 6. It is worthwhile to note that in California at least,
imprisonment for a sex offender resulted in a longer confinement period that did civil
commitment under the old sexual psychopath legislation (now repealed CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 6301 (1981). For example, a group of imprisoned sex offenders spent a mean of 54
months in prison, while the sex offenders committed as dangerous mentally disordered sex
offenders (MDSOs) spent a mean of 21.5 months. The longer time served by the imprisoned
sex offenders cannot be explained by a higher prior conviction history because the imprisoned
group had lower prior convictions than the MDSO group. Vikki Sturgeon & John Taylor, Report
of a Five-Year Study of Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders Released From Atascadero State
Hospital in 1973, 4 CRIM. JUST. J. 31-56 (1980).
12. Siegel, supra note 11, at Al.
13. Id.
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agency job for the evening."4 She never returned; her body was found one
week later. 15 Gene Raymond Kane had raped and murdered Ballasiotes
then dumped her body in another part of the city. 6 Kane had been out of
prison for just two months when he killed Ballasiotes. 7
Diane Ballasiotes' mother, Ida Ballasiotes, was outraged by a legal and
penal system that released repeat sex offenders, like Kane, into an unsuspect-
ing community. She began a grass-roots campaign to enact legislation which
would prevent, or reduce the likelihood of, violent sex crimes by repeat sex
offenders.18 An initially lukewarm response by the Washington legislature
was dramatically kindled into a firestorm of community shock and outrage
over a string of continuing violent sex crimes in Washington, most
notoriously by Earl K. Shriner. Shriner kidnapped a 7-year-old boy who was
riding his bicycle near his Tacoma home. He took the boy into the woods,
raped and strangled him, and severed his penis." Shriner had a history of
violent crimes. He killed a schoolmate when he was 16.1 After his release
from a mental institution, Shriner kidnapped and assaulted two teenage
girls.2' Shriner once told a prison cellmate that he wanted a van equipped
with cages so he could capture children, sexually abuse, and murder them?2
Shriner's vicious crime galvanized the Washington legislature to enact a new
civil commitment system, the Sexually Violent Predator law, which went into
effect July 1, 1990.1
14. Id. at A30.
15. Id.
16. Id. at Al, A30.
17. Id. at Al.
18. Id.




23. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.101-.120 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991). Westley Allan
Dodd, a 31-year-old convicted pedophile and child-murderer was arrested a few months after
Earl K. Shriner, and Dodd's crimes were part of the impetus to enact the sexual predator law.
Sally MacDonald & Carol M. Ostrom, Dodd Case Lessons Are Few, SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 6,
1993, at Al. Dodd was convicted in 1990 of the torture, rape and murder of three small boys
in 1989. Id. Dodd had a long history of violent sexual assaults on children, but had never spent
more than four months in jail at a time. Timothy Egan, Illusions Are Also Left Dead as Child-
Killer Awaits Noose, N.Y. TIMES, Dee. 29, 1992, at Al, col. 2. Dodd was executed by
hanging in Washington state on January 5, 1993. Jack Broom, Dodd Hanged, SEATrLE TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1993, at Al. The circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Sexually Violent
Predator statute are eerily reminiscent of the events which led to Massachusetts to enact their
"sexually dangerous person" statute in 1957. "Six weeks following his release from prison, a
child molester kidnapped two boys and sexually assaulted and murdered them. In immediate
response to this crime, chapter 123A of the General Laws of Mass. was written into law as a
method for preventing the premature release of a potentially dangerous person." Murray L.
Cohen et al., The Psychology of Rapists, in FORCIBLE RAPE 292 (Duncan Chappell et al., eds.,
1977). The Massachusetts law provides for indeterminate commitment for treatment at a
specially created psychiatric center within the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at
Bridgewater. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A §§ 1-11 (1992).
280 [Vol. 29
4
California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss1/10
1992] WASHINGTON'S SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTE 281
II. PROVISIONS OF THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATOR CIVIL COMMrTMENT SYSTEM
A. Classification
The Sexually Violent Predator law provides that if a person falls under
one of the following categories, the prosecuting attorney of the county where
the person was convicted or charged may file a petition alleging the person
is a sexually violent predator : (1) imprisoned for a sexually violent
offense,' (2) confined as a juvenile for a sexually violent offense, (3)
charged with a sexually violent offense but was found incompetent to stand
trial, or (4) found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of
insanity, and that person is about to be released, or has been released on,
before, or after July 1, 1990, and if the person appears to be a sexually
violent predator.' After the petition is filed, the judge determines if
probable cause exist to believe the person is a sexually violent predator.'
If so, the person is taken into custody and is required to submit to a
psychiatric evaluation by "a person deemed to be professionally qualified to
conduct such an examination."' Within forty-five days there must be a
trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator. 9
B. Trial
At all stages of the trial, the person is entitled to the assistance of
counsel as well as expert or professional psychological examination on his
own behalf.' At the trial, the court or jury's task is to determine whether
the person is a sexually violent predator. The state has the burden of
proving this beyond a reasonable doubt.31
If the person being considered for civil commitment under the Act was
found incompetent to stand trial for the offense alleged to be a sexually
violent predatory act, the state must first prove that the person committed the
act charged. 2 All rules of evidence for criminal trials and all constitutional
24. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
25. "Sexually violent offense" defined supra note 2.
26. "Sexually violent predator" defined supra note 2.
27. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
28. Id.
29. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.050 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
30. Id.
31. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
32. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991). An exception is
made if the court made a finding that the person committed the offense prior to dismissing the
case due to the person's lack of competence to stand trial. Id.
5
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rights due a defendant in a criminal trial apply in making the determina-
tion.33 If the person is found to have committed the sexually violent offense
that is the basis of the civil commitment proceeding, then the jury or court
may determine whether he is a sexually violent predator. 34
C. Commitment
If, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is found to be a sexually
violent predator, he will be committed to a secure facility in the custody of
the Washington Department of Social and Health Services35 "for control,
care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or
personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large." 36
D. Release
The person must be examined at least annually to determine his current
mental condition.37 If the person has so improved that he is no longer
likely to commit sexually violent predatory offenses if released, the person
will be permitted to petition for his release. 38  At the release hearing, the
prosecuting attorney or attorney general has the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is in fact still likely to commit sexually
violent predatory offenses if released.39 If the state cannot meet this
burden, the person is released.
33. Id.
After hearing evidence on this issue, the court shall make specific findings on
whether the person did commit the act or acts charged, the extent to which the
person's incompetence or developmental disability affected the outcome of the
hearing, including its effect on the person's ability to consult with and assist counsel
and to testify on his or her own behalf, the extent to which the evidence could be
reconstructed without the assistance of the person, and the strength of the prosecu-
tion's case. If, after the conclusion of the hearing on this issue, the court finds,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person did commit the act or acts charged, it
shall enter a final order, appealable by the person, on that issue, and may proceed to
consider whether the person should be committed pursuant to this section.
WEST REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
34. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
35. Section 71.09.060(3) provides that "[t]he facility shall not be located [at] any state mental
facility or regional habilitation center because these institutions are insufficiently secure for this
population." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(3) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991). The
Washington legislature approved $1.3 million for the new treatment center's first year operating
budget. The center is a 36-bed unit at the state prison in Monroe, Washington. The sexual
predators will be kept separate from other inmates and will not be allowed to participate in
programs that would take them outside the prison walls. Robb London, Strategy on Sex Crimes
is Prison, Then Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1991, at A2.
36. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(l) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
37. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.070 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
38. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.090(l) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
39. Id.
6
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I. THE USES OF PREDICTIONS OF DANGEROUSNESS IN THE LAW
One of the most controversial aspects of the Washington Sexually
Violent Predator statute is its reliance upon prediction of the offender's future
dangerousness by a mental health professional. The most persistent objection
to the use of such predictions is their lack of accuracy. Opponents of the
new statute claim that the prediction accuracy of individual recidivism is so
low that it seriously threatens individual freedom and autonomy without
adequate justification.' Thus, opponents of the statute argue that the statute
violates substantive due process because inaccurate prediction will render the
detention merely preventive rather than for treatment.41  Preventive
detention without treatment is then asserted to be punitive and thus the
invasion of the offender's liberty interest is not justified by the state's parens
patriae power.' Additionally, the alleged prediction inaccuracy of danger-
ousness causes the statute to be overinclusive because some sex offenders
who are not suffering from a "mental abnormality" may be confined.43
Critics of the scheme contend such overinclusiveness prevents the statute
from being sufficiently narrowly drawn to serve the state's compelling
interest in treating the offender and preventing him from re-offending.A
These arguments against the Act's constitutionality may be addressed by
an analysis of the use of dangerousness predictions in the American legal and
penal systems. Predictions of dangerousness are central to law enforcement
and the judicial system's mandate to control crime.45 They are also key to
the mental health profession's ability to contribute to the decision of who
should be detained involuntarily due to mental disease or abnormality.
Alan Dershowitz states that preventive confinement of persons predicted
to be dangerous has "always been practiced, to some degree, by every
society in history regardless of the jurisprudential rhetoric it has em-
ployed ... it is likely that some forms of preventive confinement will
40. See Bodine, supra note 6, at 121, 122; LaFond, supra note 6, at A9; Jim Simon Peter
Lewis, Challenge of New Lockup System for Sex Offenders is Expected, SEATrLE TIMES, June
30, 1990, at A9. Gerard Sheehan, legislative director of the American Civil Liberties Union
of Washington, states that the Sexual Predator statute is unconstitutional because it confines the
offenders "based on the government's speculation about what a person may do in the future.
Our system of justice does not deprive people of their liberty before they've been convicted of
any wrongdoing." Julie Emery, Mixed Reaction to Predator Commitment, SEATrLE TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1991 at A9. Of course, the Sexually Violent Predator statute does not confine anyone
"before they've been convicted of any wrongdoing." If the offender was found incompetent to
stand trial, there must be a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual offense was
committed by the person. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(2) (West Supp. 1991). While
such a finding is not a criminal "conviction," it does prove that the offender did commit the act.
41. Bodine, supra note 6, at 121, 122; Gleb, supra note 8, at 228.
42. Bodine, supra note 6, at 122.
43. Id. at 123; LaFond, supra note 6, at A9.
44. Id.
45. Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical Concerns and
Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 393 (1986).
7
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continue to be practiced by every society."' Marc Miller and Norval
Morris, two of the foremost authorities on the use of prediction in the law,
believe that "a jurisprudence that pretends to exclude the role of predictions
of dangerousness is self-deceptive."47 The Washington Sexually Violent
Predator statute depends upon expert prediction. There are many areas of
law and mental health where such predictions are routinely used. The
following is a discussion of the Supreme Court's approval of the use of
predictions of dangerousness in the contexts of pretrial detention of juveniles,
sentencing, pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act, parole release
decisions, the imposition of the death sentence, and involuntary civil commit-
ment.
A. Pretrial Detention
In considering whether pretrial detention of juveniles4 based on
prediction of future dangerousness comported with the fundamental fairness
required by due process, in Schall v. Martin"9 the Supreme Court upheld
the use of such predictions.' The District Court below found that because
of the limitations on prediction of future criminal conduct,5' "it is impossi-
ble to predict future behavior and . . . the question is so vague as to be
meaningless." 52 Thus, the District Court held, the ultimate decision to
detain was "intrinsically arbitrary and uncontrolled," and therefore violated
procedural due process. 3
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the pretrial detention
decision was unconstitutionally arbitrary, stating "from a legal point of view
there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal
conduct."s The Court specifically refuted the contention that such
predictions were "impossible" and "meaningless."55
The Court went on to acknowledge that prediction of future criminal
conduct is "an experienced prediction based on a host of variables" which
46. Alan Dershovitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law. Part
I: The English Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 57 (1974).
47. Miller & Morris, supra note 45, at 395.
48. The New York statute in question authorized, without probable cause, pretrial detention
of an accused juvenile delinquent. The detention was based on a finding that there was a
"serious risk" that a juvenile will "before the return date commit an act which if committed by
an adult would constitute a crime." NEW YORK JUDICIAL LAW § 320.5 (McKinney 1983).
49. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
50. Id. at 263.
51. Id. at 278.
52. Id. at 279 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ)).
53. Id. at 263 (citing United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasberg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 713, 716(1981)).
54. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 278-79
[Vol. 29
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are not possible to codify.' Psychiatric prediction is therefore considered
only one part of the full information required for the decision to detain. That
prediction may prove "inaccurate" and "dangerousness" impossible to codify
does not rule out prediction as an acceptable tool in the decision to detain.
Such a decision is a legal, not psychiatric judgement.
Although it is possible the Supreme Court was influenced to permit this
short-term, prehearing detention by the need to protect juvenile defendants,
the Court later held in United States v. Salerno57 that similar intrusions
upon an adult's liberty are also permissible. Furthermore, since the
Washington Sexual Predator commitment law is designed to confine the
mentally ill, the parens patriae justification underlying Schall v. Martin is
also implicit in the goals of the Washington scheme, which is to treat rather
than punish sexually violent predators.
B. Sentencing
Predictions of future criminal conduct form the basis of enhanced
sentences under the federal Dangerous Special Offender statute.5" That law
defines a dangerous offender as a person for whom a "period of confinement
longer than that provided for such [a] felony is required for the protection of
the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant."59 In Schall v.
Martin, while addressing the issue of whether a pretrial juvenile detention
statute was unconstitutionally vague because prediction of the juvenile's
future dangerousness was "impossible" and "so vague as to be meaning-
less, " '° the Court cited, the numerous appellate decisions rejecting that
contention as applied to the Dangerous Special Offender decision under
section 3575(f).61
For example, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Williamson62 declined to hold a judge's determination that a criminal was
a Dangerous Offender under section 3575(f) was unconstitutionally vague and
56. Id. at 279 (citing Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979)).
57. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Salerno is discussed in section III.D, infra.
58. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575 (,est 1985).
59. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(f) (West 1985).
60. Schall, 467 U.S. at 278-79.
61. "[A] judgment [about future criminal conduct] forms an important element in many
decisions ... A prediction of future conduct may... form the basis for an increased sentence
under [18 U.S.C. § 3575] . . ." The statute has been challenged numerous times on the grounds
that the standard (for a finding that an offender should be classified as a "dangerous special
offender") is unconstitutionally vague. Every Court of Appeals considering the question has
rejected that claim. Schall, 467 U.S. at 279 n.30 (citing United States v. Davis, 710 F.2d 104,
108-09 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 675-76 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610, 613 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d
1160, 1175 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184, 1194 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 336-37 (6th Cir. 1976)).
62. 567 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1977).
9
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meaningless.' The Court explained the "[l]ikelihood of future criminality
and the potential danger to society are determinations implicit in sentencing
decisions. The concept of dangerousness as defined in section 3575 is a
verbalization of considerations underlying any sentencing decision."
Furthermore, "[j]udges are not unfamiliar with determining dangerousness."
Accordingly, the court held that section 3575 was not unconstitutionally
vague as applied to the statutory concept of dangerousness.'
Further, the Tenth Circuit in the case of United States v. Schell,'
addressed the constitutionality of section 3575's preponderance of the
evidence standard, finding that due process does not require a "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof.1 Regarding accuracy of such predic-
tions of future criminality under section 3575, the court observed:
We... recognize the difficulties in making a finding of dangerousness,
and that any clinical or diagnostic process for identifying such offenders
probably results in significant overpredition... But the Supreme Court
has said, in connection with civil commitments for mental illness, "there
is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be
dangerous."67
While the Supreme Court has not rendered an opinion regarding the
federal Dangerous Special Offender statute, the Court's citing with approval
the Courts of Appeals decisions in the case of Schall v. Martin indicates that
section 3575 would probably not be held unconstitutional. Again, despite the
recognized problems with the commonly accepted "one-third" accuracy, the
court does not question the validity of dangerousness predictions in criminal
justice decisions.
C. Preventive Detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (the Act), pretrial detention of
arrestees is based upon prediction of future dangerousness. The Act requires
detention of arrestees charged with certain serious felonies if the Government
proves through clear and convincing evidence in an adversary hearing, that
no conditions to the arrestee's release will "reasonably assure ... the safety
of any other person and the community."' In United States v. Salerno, use
of prediction of dangerousness as a part of the decision to detain under the
Act was held constitutional, especially where there are extensive procedural
63. Id. at 613.
64. Id. at 613 n.7.
65. 692 F.2d 672, 678 (10th Cir. 1982).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 679.
68. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (West 1985).
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safeguards.'a Petitioners Salerno and Cafaro' argued the Due Process
Clause absolutely prohibited pretrial detention based upon the detainee's
predicted danger to the community,7 since the criminal law is designed to
hold persons accountable for past, not future actions.2
Discussing the typical due process challenge to the Act, based on
concerns that prediction is so inaccurate as to be unconstitutionally arbitrary,
the Supreme Court reemphasized that "there is nothing inherently unattain-
able about a prediction of future criminal conduct. " ' The court noted the
judicial officer making the detention decision was guided by statutorily
defined factors, and was required to submit written findings of fact and a
written statement of the reasons to detain.7' Therefore, the decision to
detain was not arbitrary and did not violate due process.75 Similarly, the
Washington Sexual Predator Statute involves no unbridled discretion because
of the stringent requirements to qualify a person under the statute76 and
because the proceeding is before a judge or jury with all of the constitutional
protections normally afforded a criminal defendant.7
D. Parole Release Decisions
The Supreme Court also approved the use of predictions of dangerous-
ness in deciding whether prison inmates are to be granted parole. Greenholtz
v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex78 involved a
class action by Nebraska prison inmates who claimed the Parole Board's
procedures for deciding whether to grant parole violated procedural due
process. Their contention was based upon the asserted lack of accuracy in
such prediction.79 The Court pointed out that:
inhere simply is no constitutional guarantee that all executive
decisionmaking must comply with standards that assure errorfree determi-
nations.' . .. [The parole determination... often involve[s] no more
than informed predictions as to what would best serve [correctional
69. 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
70. "Boss" and "captain," respectively, of the Genovese Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra
(the Mafia).
71. 481 U.S. at 744.
72. Id. at 745.
73. Id. at 751 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. at 278).
74. 481 U.S. at 751-52.
75. Id. at 752.
76. As of December, 1991, nearly 2,000 sex offenders had been reviewed for consideration
under the Sexually Violent Predator Act. Only twelve of those cases were filed for a civil
commitment hearing. Michael McCarthy, Do They Belong Behind Bars?, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1991, at El, col. 6.
77. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.050 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
78. 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id. at 7.
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purposes] or the safety and welfare of the inmate."' The decision turns
on a 'discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing
primarily what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what
he has done.'"
It is apparent from the language that prediction of an aspiring parolee's
future risk of dangerousness was acceptable to the Court in spite of despite
its imperfection and subjective quality." The Court emphasized that
prediction is a combination of "psychological factors combined with fact
evaluation: ""
No ideal, error-free way to make parole-release decisions has been devel-
oped; the whole question has been and will continue to be the subject of
experimentation involving analysis of psychological factors combined with
fact evaluation guided by the practical experience of the actual parole
decisionmakers m predicting future behavior. Our system of federalism
encourages this state experimentation.8
The decision whether or not to parole is a legal decision, not a purely
psychiatric decision. The accuracy of a prediction may be challenged, but
its probativeness is not so insubstantial that the Court should automatically
exclude it. 6
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in Peno-
Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REv. 803, 813 (1961)).
83. It is interesting to note that at least one state, Michigan, has had reasonably good success
in predicting violent recidivism (sex crime, robbery or murder) by parolees. This is analogous
to the decision whether the person processed under the Washington Sexually Violent Predator
statute is likely to be sexually violent in the future. Michigan's "Assaultive Risk Screening" was
the subject of a 14-month parole period study involving 1200 male parolees. Of the prisoners
predicted to be a "very high" assault risk, 40 percent were re-arrested and returned to state
prison while free on parole. Twenty-one percent of the "high risk" prisoners recidivated with
a violent offense. Twelve percent of the "medium risk" prisoners, six percent of the "low risk"
and two percent of the "very low risk" prisoners re-offended for a violent offense. Thus, the
group of prisoners predicted to be a very high risk for violent re-offense were twenty times more
likely to return to prison for a violent crime than those predicted to be in the "very low risk"
group. On the other hand, of every ten prisoners predicted to be a "very high" risk, six did not
return to prison for a violent crime in the 14-month period. JOHN MONAHAN & LATJRENS
WAIXER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAw: CASES AND MATERIALs 168-70 (1985). Still, these figures
are more accurate than the "two-thirds" false positive so frequently mentioned.
84. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13.
85. Id.
86. One suggestion to reduce the unreliability of psychiatric prediction in the sexual predator
civil commitment hearings is to use a "modified Frye test" to allow only psychiatric predictions
which are proven based upon prevailing accepted psychiatric prediction methodologies. See
Gary Gleb, supra note 8, at 240-50. Such an evidentiary hurdle would fulfill the requirement,
urged by Marc Miller and Norvall Morris, that clinical predictions of dangerousness be used in
the courts only where they are supported by valid actuarial studies. Miller & Morris, supra note
45. See also Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgement, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979) (discussing the
relative merits and problems associated with the use of clinical prediction versus statistical
prediction).
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E. Predictions of Dangerousness and the Death Sentence
The use of predictions of dangerousness in deciding to impose the death
sentence was challenged in Barefoot v. Estelle,r where it was urged that
such predictions were unconstitutional because psychiatrists individually, and
as a class, were incompetent to predict dangerousness. The Supreme Court
opined that barring psychiatric prediction of dangerousness "is somewhat like
asking us to disinvent the wheel.""5
The Court relied upon John Monahan, one of the foremost authorities on
prediction in law and a professor of law at the University of Virginia, who
stated: "there may be circumstances in which prediction is both empirically
possible and ethically appropriate."" The Court explained its rationale for
accepting the use of psychiatric prediction of dangerousness in the context of
the gravest issue-whether to impose the death sentence:
All of these professional doubts about the usefulness of psychiatric
predictions can be called to the attention of the jury. Petitioner's entire
argument... is founded on the premise that a jury will not be able to
separate the wheat from the chaff. We do not share m this low evaluation
of the adversary process .... Such disputes are within the province of thejury to resolve. Indeed, it is a fundamental premise of our entire system
of criminal jurisprudence that the purpose of the jury is to sort out the true
testimony from the false ... and, when called upon to do so, give greater
credence to one party's expert witness than another's.9
Barefoot v. Estelle gives us one of the most explicit explanations of why
the Court has uniformly upheld the use of predictions of dangerousness.
Prediction by an expert witness is acknowledged to be imperfect; but like
other kinds of expert testimony it is subject to attack by the defendant. The
court places its faith in the ability of the jury to decide what weight to assign
each expert's testimony. Some have suggested that a Frye-type test, designed
to prevent introduction of expert testimony or results of tests or experiments
which lack acceptance by the scientific community.9" This may be an
effective curb on psychiatric prediction that lack an objective basis.
87. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
88. Id. at 896. "[IUf it is not impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at [the
conclusion that a defendant is likely to commit future crimes], it makes little sense, if any, to
submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who might have an opinion on the
issue, would know so little about the subject that they should not be permitted to testify." Id.
at 896-97.
89. Id. at 901 (citing JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR,
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Pub. No. 81-921 at v (1981)).
90. Id. at 901-02.
91. This is the suggestion of Gary Gleb in his Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent
Predator Law: the Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil
Commitment Proceedings, supra note 8.
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F. Insanity Acquitees and Predictions of Dangerousness
Jones v. United States dealt with an insanity acquittee's involuntary
commitment based upon proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he
was insane. Accordingly, Jones asserted the finding of insanity at his
criminal trial was insufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness
to justify his indefinite civil commitment because of the preponderance
standard used.' The petitioner urged that under Addington v. Texas, a state
must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence, in a civil commitment
hearing that the individual was both mentally ill and dangerous before
confinement was justified.' Therefore, Jones argued, it was unreasonable
and therefore unconstitutional to keep him in confinement without additional
hearings to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he was
mentally ill and dangerous.' In Jones, the Court held it is not unreason-
able to base the insanity acquitee's automatic commitment upon a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity even if there had been no independent finding
of dangerousness:' "[t]he fact that a person has been found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates
dangerousness.... Indeed, this concrete evidence generally may be at least
as persuasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be made in
a civil-commitment proceeding."'
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator commitment scheme presents the
fact-finder with evidence in the form of prediction of dangerousness by
mental health experts as well as the predator's past violent acts. Before past
violent acts may be used in the commitment decision, it must be proven,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the subject committed the act.' This,
coupled with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, which underlies the
commitment decision itself, minimizes the effect of the purported unreliabili-
ty of prediction.9"
92. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983).
93. Id. at 362 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 426-27).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 364.
96. Id.
97. If the offender was found not able to stand trial because of mental incompetence, the court
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the person committed the sexually violent offense that
is the basis of the action before proceeding to the civil commitment decision. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
98. In Jones v. United States, Brennan, J. dissenting stated: "mo require as a constitutional
matter more than clear and convincing evidence-i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt-would
unduly impair governmental efforts to protect both the mentally ill and society at large." Jones,
463 U.S. at 372 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 427-31). The Court recently reempha-
sized that clear and convincing remains the constitutionally required standard of proof in Foucha
v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (1992). Washington clearly intends to take this burden
upon itself to remove any doubt that they may be unduly depriving sexual predators of their civil
liberties. Mare Miller and Norval Morris argue the Supreme Court is incorrect in its belief that
a state could not ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and
likely to be dangerous. They claim "[t]hat an individual is likely to be dangerous can be proved
[Vol. 29
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The petitioner in Jones directly attacked the value of using past
dangerous acts to predict future dangerousness. 99 The Court declined to
forbid government reliance upon predictive data, stating:
We do not agree with the suggestion that Congress' power to legislate in
this area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric community.
We have recognized repeatedly the 'uncertainty of diagnosis in this field
and the tentativeness of professionaljudgement. The only certain thing that
can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding
mental disease is that science has not reached finality of judgement .... '
The lesson we have drawn is not that governments may not act in the face
of this uncertainty, but rather that courts should pay particular deference
to reasonable legislative judgements.'00
The Supreme Court thus rejects the notion that unless legislation to
identify mentally disordered offenders is articulated in currently accepted
psychiatric diagnostic terms, that it is somehow an invalid exercise of the
state's police and parens patriae powers to commit such individuals.10 t
In a contentious 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court recently struck down
a Louisiana statute which permitted the state to continue to confine insanity
acquitees to psychiatric hospitals based upon a finding that the insanity
acquitee remained a danger to himself or others, regardless of whether the
individual was then mentally ill.1" In Foucha v. Louisiana, the petitioner
was found not guilty by reason of insanity of aggravated burglary and
ordered committed to a state mental facility for care, custody and treat-
ment.'r Foucha sought release from the mental facility 3 years and 5
months later.104
A lunacy hearing was held to determine whether Foucha should be
released. Although the petitioner was no longer psychotic at the time of the
hearing, the state's psychiatrist would not certify that Foucha would not be
a danger to himself or others if released. 5 Thus, Foucha was confined
at any level required, provided 'likely to be dangerous' is given careful construction (i.e. that
the individual belongs to a group with a risk of dangerousness unacceptable in relation to the
gravity of the harm)." Miller & Morris, supra note 45, at 423-24.
99. 463 U.S. at 365.
100. Id. at 365 (citing Greenwoodv. U.S., 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,
472 (1981); Addingtonv. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1979); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-537
(1968) (plurality opinion)).
101. Psychiatrists have criticized sexual psychopath legislation as too vague for use in the mental health
and legal systems, because they are based on assumptions that a recidivist sex offender is "mentally
disordered," "dangerous," and therefore is in need of "treatment." None of these assumptions, it is
claimed, have been empirically validated. Carol Veneziano & Louis Veneziano, An Analysis of Legal
Trends in the Disposition of Sex Crimes: Implications for Theory, Research, and Policy, 15 1.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 217 (1987). On the other hand, it seems self evident that at least some sex
offenders are amenable to, and in need of, treatment. It is these offenders that sexual psychopath
legislation, and the Washington Sexually Violent Predator statute particularly, aim to identify.
102. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
103. Id. at 1781.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1782-83.
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at the mental health facility based upon a finding of future dangerousness
alone, without any finding that he possessed any mental illness or abnormali-
ty, although one of the doctors who testified at the hearing stated that Foucha
suffered from an "antisocial personality," which he stated was not a "mental
disease" and was "untreatable."' °  The Louisiana statutory scheme for
insanity acquitees expressly permits such detention based solely upon the
danger the acquittee poses to himself or society."°
The majority opinion held that insanity acquitees are entitled to release
from a mental institution when the acquitee has either "recovered his sanity
or is no longer dangerous." t°8 Thus, it was a violation of due process to
continue to confine Foucha without proof that he remained mentally ill. 9
While the state urged Foucha's confinement was justified based upon his
antisocial personality, the court rejected this argument. First, keeping
Foucha against his will in a mental institution required a determination in a
civil commitment hearing that he remained "mentally ill." Based upon the
evidence given by the doctor at Foucha's hearing, an "antisocial personality"
is not "mental illness"; therefore, Louisiana has no interest in confining him
as a mentally ill person.110 Second, continuing to confine Foucha would
require constitutionally adequate procedures to establish the grounds for his
confinement; such procedures would necessarily be the same afforded a
person whom the state sought to commit, who was not an insanity
acquittee.'11  Third, Foucha's fundamental liberty interest cannot be
arbitrarily infringed upon without a carefully defined procedure in which the
state proves by clear and convincing evidence that he remains dangerous. "I
Due process permits only "carefully limited exceptions" to the fundamental
right to individual liberty.113
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion clearly indicates that while the
Louisiana scheme is insufficiently protective of an insanity acquitees'
procedural and substantive due process rights, more narrowly designed
statutes (such as that enacted by Washington) may receive more favorable
treatment by the Court: "I do not understand the Court to hold that Louisiana
may never confine dangerous insanity acquitees after they regain mental
health." 1 4 O'Connor reemphasized that, "[t]he only certain thing that can
be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding mental
disease is that science has not reached finality of judgement ... courts
106. Id. at 1782.
107. "[T]he court may either continue the commitment or hold a contradictory hearing to determine
whether the committed person can be discharged, or can be released on probation, without danger to
others or to himself." LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West 1981 and 1992 Supp.)
108. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983)).
109. Id. at 1784-85.
110. Id.
I11.Id. at 1785.
112. Id. at 1786 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. at 362).
113. Id. at 1786, 1787.
114. Id. at 1789 (emphasis added).
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should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgements about the
relationship between dangerous behavior and mental illness."" 5 O'Connor
stated that she would give judicial deference to "the States' freedom to
determine whether and to what extent mental illness should excuse criminal
behavior." 1
Foucha indicates that Washington's narrowly drawn Sexual Predator
scheme, which applies only to a very select group of sex offenders, and
which contains the full procedural protections of an adversarial hearing and
a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof for the State to prove
dangerousness, would be found constitutional by the Court."7 While the
constitutionality of a state's use of psychiatric prediction of dangerousness
was not addressed, the entire opinion is based upon acceptance of the
premise that dangerousness is a valid basis for confinement. It seems clear
the Court has accepted predictions of dangerousness as a legitimate tool for
states to employ in determining the nature and duration of criminal and civil
confinements.
The above Supreme Court cases unanimously favor the use of prediction
of dangerousness by psychiatrists, other mental health professionals, judges
and penal authorities. The Court has rejected arguments that such predic-
tions are not sufficiently accurate to supply the requisite certainty in a given
situation. Instead, the Court favors the use of prediction as an evidentiary
element in a decision that is legal, not purely psychiatric. Additionally, the
Court defers to legislative judgements as to what constitutes dangerousness
and how dangerousness shall be determined. George E. Dix, Professor of
Law at the University of Texas at Austin, comments:
[l]t is unquestionably correct that the issue [of a person's future dangerous-
ness in a sexually dangerous person hearing] should not be
delegated-formally or informally-to expert witnesses... The degree of
certainty or specificity that should be required must be determined in light
of what is currently possible given the state of the predictive art. No brief
can be made for requiring greater certainty or specificity than is ever
possible by conscientious ancd skilled clinical practitioners who are aware
of and sensitive to the debate concerning the value of clinical predictive
testimony. " "
IV. PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS: PITFALLS AND POSSIBILITIES
The cases and critical literature associated with the issue of prediction of
dangerousness frequently point to the problem of accuracy. It has been
widely accepted for some time that predictions of an individual's likelihood
115. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 (1983)).
116. Id. at 1790.
117. "It might therefore be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained
sanity if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and duration of detention were tailored to reflect
pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness." Id. at 1789.
118. Dix, supra note 10, at 173.
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of committing future serious violent crime are only one-third accurate.119
Thus, there is asserted to be a two-thirds "false positive" prediction
associated with prediction of future violent behaviors."2 However, critics
recently have suggested that the studies which are the basis of this figure
should be regarded with skepticism,"' because the studies examine judg-
ments which are not dangerousness-specific (e.g. civil commitment) rather
than civil commitment specifically because of predicted dangerousness (the
nature of the Washington statute.) '"
Those critical of the use of prediction" argue that since we do not
incarcerate criminals based upon a less than "beyond a reasonable doubt"
probability, nor civilly commit individuals under many civil commitment
schemes without a "clear and convincing evidence" standard, then society
cannot justify deprivation of individuals liberty based upon a 33 % accuracy
119. JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47 U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Services Pub. No. 81-921 (1981). Monahan states: "it would be fair to conclude that the 'best'
clinical research currently in existence indicates that psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no
more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior over a several-yearperiod among institutional-
ized populations that had both committed violence in the past (and thus had high base rates for it) and
who were diagnosed as mentally ill." Monahan's conclusion was based upon the five best available
studies at that time.
A summary of their findings regarding accuracy of clinical prediction of violent behavior is as
follows: (1) Harry L. Kozol, et al., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY 371-92 (1972), a 10-year study of 592 male offenders, mostly convicted of violent sex
crimes, conducted through the Massachusetts Center for the Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerous
Persons-65.3% false positive; (2) HENRY J. STEADMAN & JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE
CRIMINALLY INSANE (1974), a study of patients released from New York State hospitals for the criminally
insane after the U.S. Supreme Court decision Baxtrom v. Herold -80.0% false positive; (3) Joseph J.
Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and
Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084-1101 (1976), an analysis of 257 indicted felony
defendants found incompetent to stand trial in New York State in 1971 and 1972-86.0% false positive;
(4) Henry J. Steadman, A New Look at Recidivism among Paturent Inmates, 5 BULL. AM. AcAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 200-209 (1977), an evaluation of the Patuxent Institution in Maryland, 58.7% false
positive. This study found only 10 percent difference in rate of re-arrest for violent crime betweengroups
predicted not dangerous by the Patuxent staff, and groups predicted violent by the staff, but released.
This small difference resulted in the Maryland legislature abolishing the statute under which the Patuxent
program had operated. (5) T. Thornberry & J. Jacoby, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: A COMMUNITY
FOLLOW-UP OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS (1979), following the behavior of 438 mentally disordered
offenders who successfully petitioned for their release from a Pennsylvania institution (Dixon v.
Pennsylvania (1971)) subsequentto Baxtrom-86.0 % false positives. All studies above cited in MONAHAN,
supra, at 44-48.
120. MONAHAN, supra note 119, at 47.
121. Thomas Grisso, Clinical Assessments for Legal Decisionmaking: Research Recommendations, in
LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 49, 67 (U. S. Dept of
Health and Human Services Pub. No. 91-1875 (Saleem Shah and Bruce D. Sales, eds., 1991)).
122. Id. Grisso urges that because many studies examining the relationship between case variables and
future violence have not improved the clinician's ability to accurately predict individual likelihood of
future violence, that the objectives of research should be reconsidered to focus not on predicting violence,
but rather on discovering factors which reliably indicate an increase in the risk of violence. Such
research, if able to identify which individuals are prone to a greater probability of future violence ralative
to others, this is significant even though it is not a specific prediction. Id. at 68.
123. Some of the most vociferous critics are psychiatrists. Yet their objections are somewhat ironic in
that prediction "is an everyday feature in other aspects of [mental health professionals'] . . . clinical
practice. This is especially true of medical practice, where the diagnostic process can be viewed as an
effort to predict that the patient may experience certain incapacities." SEYMOUR HALLEcK, THE
MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 89 (U.S. Dept. of Health & HumanServ. Pub. No. 86-1471 (1974)).
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rate which apparently cannot meet either of these evidentiary tests.1
2
"
However, Morris and Miller argue persuasively that this view is based upon
a fundamental misunderstanding between two distinct concepts: the standard
of proof required to establish the individuals' "dangerousness," and the level
of "unacceptable" risk that society chooses to define as "dangerous":
The existence of dangerousness is not a question of the weight of the
burden of proof... and it is a mistake to decide the balance between the
risk to the community and the restrictions on the individual in terms of the
burden of proof.... mhe elements that lead to a justified use of
predictions of dangerousness, the determination of acceptable and
unacceptable levels of risk is an entirely distinct policy question to be
decided by a legislature... the answer is not capable of expression solely
as a problem of evidence. Once the risk is defined, the elements that go to
prove the existence of that risk can be made subject to different burdens of
proof, but not the risk itself.... We reject on logical grounds any tie
between standard of proof and the level of prediction necessary to justify
preventive detention.... The confusion of the standard of proof with
levels of prediction has been the greatest barrier to a sensitive consideration
of the jurisprudence of dangerousness in American courts.'I
John Monahan and David Wexler, prominent theorists of prediction science,
also endorse this theory. Monahan and Wexler posit that a prediction of
dangerousness includes three separable assertions: (1) the individual has
certain characteristics, (2) those characteristics are associated with a certain
probability of violence, and (3) the probability of violent behavior is
"sufficiently" great to justify preventive detention." They declare the first
two assertions may be subjected to varying standards of proof, while the
third assertion is a social policy decision. 27 The confusion about predic-
tion of dangerousness and the 66 % "false positive problem," therefore, stems
from the fact that many erroneously suppose that "standards of proof" apply
to the third assertion, and therefore the probability of violence must be ninety
percent (under a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard) or seventy-five
percent (under a 'clear and convincing evidence' standard) or fifty-one
percent (under a 'preponderance of the evidence' standard.)" The proper
understanding of this issue, according to Monahan and Wexler, is one must
prove to a particular level of certainty only that a specified probability
threshold has been crossed, the threshold itself being decided on policy
grounds."2 The issue then is whether a particular probability of violent
behavior is sufficient to justify confinement under a civil commitment law,
124. Michael Tonry, Prediction and Classification: Legal and Ethical Issues, 9 CRIME & JUST. 367, 395
(1987).
125. Miller & Morris, supra note 45, at 424 & n.67.
126. John Monahan & David Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment,
2 L. & HUM. BEaAv. 37 (1978).
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which is resolved not by "proof," but by legislative policy making and
constitutional interest balancing.1 °
Another view of the "two thirds false-positive" dilemma is the "false
positives," rather than being considered an error in individual prediction,
should be considered a 100 percent correct identification of members of a
group that have a 33 percent violence Mprobability. In this view, it is an
error to envision the prediction of dangerousness as a result.132  Rather,
prediction of dangerousness based on membership in a group for which a
consistent, verified pattern of conduct has been proven, is a statement of a
condition.t 3 That condition is membership in a defined group with certain
attributes, and not the prediction of a result of future violent acts in each
individual case. t"4 Miller and Morris analogize this situation to the
presence of many unexploded bombs in postwar London. Death or injury
due to the bombs was quite rare. Yet given that all the bombs had the
potential to explode, it could not be said that the bombs which did not
explode were not "dangerous," and therefore they could safely remain in the
city.135
Another indication that the "false positive" problem may be misleading
is some of the "false positives" are actually true positives, whose real violent
acts were undetected by authorities, unreported by the victims," or not
prosecuted for a variety of reasons.137 For example, a recent study of
Washington sex offenders participating in a self-reporting, anonymous
interview regarding their actual past criminal acts revealed that among
rapists, law enforcement records showed a mean number of 1.8 rape victims
per offender.131  However, this same group of sex offenders self-reported
130. Id.
131. Tonry, supra note 124, at 396.
132. Miller & Morris, supra note 45, at 410.
133. rd.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 411.
136. A recent Senate report revealed that in 1990, 100,433 rapes against women were reported (300
rapes per day) However, if non-reported rapes are taken into account, the report stated there are as many
as 2 million rapes per year nationwide. Also, 29 individual states reported record numbers of rapes in
1990. The greatest numberoccurred in California-12,413. Other leading states in numbers of rapes were
Texas-8,427; Michigan-6,938; Florida-6,874; New York-5,315. Janet Bass, More Women Raped
In 1990 Than in Any Year in U.S. History, UPI, March 22, 1991 available in D)X, Nexis Library, UPI
File.
137. In the New York City District Attorney's office only one-third of cases involving stranger asrailants,
and 7 percent of known assailants, were indicted. One third of the stranger assailant's cases were
dismissed, and half of the known assailant cases were dismissed. "These numbers are consistent with an
almost systematic downgrading or dismissing of cases involving nonstrangers. . . " SUSAN ESRICH,
REAL RAPE 18 (1987) (citing Maxine Pfeffer, Where Have All the Sex Crimes Gone, student paper,
Harvard Law School 1985.)
138. Mark R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, SeIf-Report of Crimes Committed by Sex Offenders, 6 J. OF
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 286, 291 (1991). The sex offenders who participated in this study were
recruited from the sex offender treatment program at Western State Hospital in Fort Steilacoom,
Washington. The offenders were in the facility as civil committees for an indeterminate period as "sexual
psychopaths," and had not been confined under the new Sexually Violent Predator statute. However, it
is interesting to note that the group in the study is likely to be representative of the kinds of offenders who
are targeted by the Washington law.
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a mean rate of 11.7 victims per offender."3 9 While the law enforcement
records for the group showed a total of 66 charged sex offenses for the
group, the self-report revealed a total of 433 actual rapes committed. t40
Data for child molesters was even more dramatic: while records showed
a median of 1 victim per offender, self-reporting revealed a median of seven
victims each.1 41 While law enforcement reported the group had molested
136 different victims, in the self-report, the molesters admitted to having
molested 959 different victims.142 Several other studies of offender self-
reporting support the results of the Washington study above. 43
Statistics of victim reporting also demonstrate that rape is underreported,
contributing to the problem of undetected recidivism. The Department of
Justice's victimization surveys indicate that between 1973 and 1982, 165 out
of every 100,000 women in the U.S. were victims of either completed rape
or a rape attempt. 1" These rates projected result in nearly twice as many
offenses as reflected by official police data."4 The victims reported the
crimes between 42% (1980) and 58% (1977) of the time."4
These studies suggest that using actual convictions as the true incidence
of recidivism is naive. Although Miller and Morris reject the use of
unreported crime to bolster the use of predictions, they maintain that





143. Another recent confidential survey of sex offenders revealed that the frequency of rape and/or child
molestation is much higher than reported in the literature. 207 men reported 796 attempted or completed
rapes against adult females, for a mean of 3.9 victims per subject; a shocking 14,950 attempted or
completed child molestations were admitted by the same group of 207 men, resulting in 72.2 mean
number of child victims. Sex offenders primarily interested in homosexual pedophilia (attraction to young
boys) reported the largest number of offenses-31 men admitted 6,364 separate attempted or completed
offenses. 26 men primarily aroused by heterosexual pedophilia (attraction to young girls) admitted to
3,120 such offenses, for a mean of 120.0 attempted or completed child molestations per subject. The
authors of the survey state that "unless effective intervention helps them gain control over their deviant
behavior, they are highly likely to continue committing sexual offenses." Gene G. Abel, et al. Behavioral
Approaches to Treatment of the Violent Sex Offender, in CLINICALTREATMENT OF THE VIOLENT IERSON
95-96 (Loren H. Roth, ed. (1987)). See also A. Nicholas Groth, et al., Undetected Recidivism in Rapists
and Child Molesters, 28 CRIME AND DELINQUENcY450-458 (1982) and G.G. Abel, et al., Self-Reported
Sex Crimes ofNonincarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3-25 (1987).
144. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 11 (1987) (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice Bureau of Statistics Bulletin,
THE CRIME OF RAPE (March 1985)).
145. Id. at 11.
146. Id. Susan Estrich, a leading legal scholar on rape and a professor of law at U.S.C., explains this
lack of reporting as partly due to the problem of defining "rape" as "a crime committed by strangers."
Id. Consequently, women attacked by men they know are unlikely to report the crime to the police, even
where the assault involves serious threats, force, or injury to the victim. Id. (citing Linda S. Williams,
The Classic Rape: When Do Victims Report?, 31 Soc. PROBs. 464 (1984), Judy Foreman, Most Rape
Victims Know Assailant, Don't Report to Police, Report Says, BOSTON GLOBE, April 16, 1986 at 27.)
Further broadening the definition of "rape" in victimization surveys to include events characterized, not
as "rape," but as "forced intercourse or intercourse obtained by threat" reveals that the rape rate will
jump from 22% to 56%. Id. at 12 (citing DIANA RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, 34-37, 101). This
reflects the lack of understanding among many women as to when they are considered true victims of
crime.
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admittedly lower) crime rate any less acceptable.47 However, any decision
in the criminal justice and mental health systems which will interfere with
individual liberty must be made upon as much information as possible.
While it may not yet be possible to determine exactly how many more crimes
the sexual predator will commit for which he will be neither arrested nor
charged, there is compelling evidence that the widely accepted two-thirds
"false positive" incidence seriously understates the rate of re-offense by
convicted sex offenders.148
How one views the fundamental fairness of predicting an individual's
future dangerousness depends partly on how one defines dangerousness.
According to Alexander Brooks, a prominent theorist of human behavior and
the law, dangerousness can be considered as consisting of four different
elements: (1) the magnitude of harm (2) the probability that the harm will
occur (3) the frequency with which the harm will occur, and (4) the
imminence of the harm.1 49 The interaction of these elements will allow a
judgement about the dangerousness of the individual. For example,
a harm which is not likely to occur but which is very serious may add up
to dangerousness. By the same token a relatively trivial harm which is
highly likely to occur with great frequency might also add up to dangerous-
ness. On the other hand a trivial harm even though it is likely to occur,
might not add up to dangerousness.' 50
This test is essentially Judge Learned Hand's formulation of the "clear
and present danger" test applied to government abridgement of First
Amendment free speech rights. Originally, the "clear and present danger"
test required that where there be reasonable grounds to believe that a grave
harm is imminent.' However, Hand emphasized the gravity of the harm
as the most critical factor in the test, and the imminence or remoteness of the
harm was refined to the event's relative probability. 52 Hand's rationale
for refining the requirement that the threatened harm be imminent was that
147. Miller & Morris, supra note 45, at 424.
148. While predicting which offenders are likely to be violent in the future is a complex task, some tools
of prediction have been developed which assist the decision-maker in arriving at a maximally accurate
prediction. In a study of serial rapists and victims of serial rapists for purposes of classifying the rapist
by type, and for classifying the offender according to propensity to use increasing violence in successive
rapes, it was found that it was possible to classify rapists according to their propensity to increased
violence in successive rapes with 92% accuracy. Janet I. Warren, et al., Prediction of Rapist Type and
Violence from Verbal, Physical and Sexual Scales, 6 J. OF INTERPERSONALVIOLENCE55, 61 (1991). The
authors offered their method as having potential application for a clinician in an evaluative situation to
assess the offenders potential for future violent behavior. Id. at 65. Additionally, the classification scheme
advanced in the study revealed that some rapist types "reflect a less intrusive form of rape behavior" than
others. Id. at 64. The ability to classify a sex offender according to how forceful or violent the offender
is prone to be would be a useful factor in any proceeding under the Washington Sexually Violent Predator
civil commitment scheme.
149. HALLECK, supra note 123, at 85 (citing ALEXANDER BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THEMENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM (1974)).
150. Id.
151. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
152. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
[Vol. 29
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otherwise, society would be forced to endure harms which, if they were
imminent, they would prevent."' Thus, the "clear and present danger"
test was employed by Hand to balance the competing values of society's
desire for protection with the free speech rights at issue in the case."u
Against this formulation of the "clear and present danger" test is the fear
that it is expandable to encompass all sorts of "undesireables" who are
engaging in behavior that is considered gravely harmful, but unlikely to
occur. Without the requirement of imminent harm, it is argued that
fundamental freedoms such as free speech, or as in the Washington statute,
liberty, will be subject to political judgements about what constitutes a
"grave harm" and ad hoc decisions about how probable the harm ought to
be. For example, it could be argued that the same justification for indefinite-
ly committing predatory sex offenders under the Washington statute exists
where drug addicts can be determined to be likely to commit future crimes
to support their drug habit. Would this be a less acceptable application of
commitment or detention due to "dangerousness"? Arguably not, because
for now, it seems clear that society is willing to accept the risk of robberies,
burglaries, petty theft, and even murders committed by drug addicts in order
that they can retain their liberty. This is clearly a balancing test, wherein
society decides which harms it will tolerate, and which it will not. So long
as the intrusion on an individual's rights is supported by a legitimate
government interest, then it is simply a matter of policy where the line is
drawn between the individual's rights, and those of society. Regarding sex
crimes, society has clearly condemned most sex offenses. Until recently,
rape was one of a very few crimes in some states for which a person could
receive the death penalty.155 In the case striking down the death penalty
as a cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of rape, the Supreme Court
stated:
[Rape is] highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total
contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and
for the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relations are
to be established. Short of homicide, it is the "ultimate violation of
153. MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE 130 (1977).
154. Id. Hand's formulation of the "clear and present danger" test was adopted by the Supreme Court
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), holding the Communist Party's "highly organized
conspiracy" coupled with the reality of the Cold War, created both a grave and probable danger, sufficient
to permit the Communist Party's leaders conviction under the Smith Act for willfully and knowingly
conspiring to organize as a group to teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the United States
government by force and violence, and knowingly and wilfully advocating and teaching the duty and
necessity of overthrowing and destroying the government by force and violence. Id.
155. "In 1925, 18 states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government authorized capital
punishment for the rape of an adult female. By 1971 ... that number had declined ... to 16 states
plus the federal government ... [Afier states revised their death penalty statutes in the wake of Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)] only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult wom-
an... Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana." Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1977). (In
Coker, the Supreme Court struck down these laws as unconstitutional as a "grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime of rape and [are] therefore forbidden by the eight amendment as cruel
and unusual punishment." Id. at 592.
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self." ... Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there
is public injury as well."s
Using the Hand/Brooks model of dangerousness, the Washington state
legislature appears to have decided that even if theoretically the probability
of future sex offense by the potential sexual predator is only one-third
(following conventional statistics,) 57 such a relatively low probability is
outweighed by the magnitude of the harm to the victim. The statute also
implies that the higher rate of repetition, particularly among child molest-
ers,15 8 constitutes sufficient frequency of occurrence to counterbalance the
lack of imminent harm, since the Washington statute is designed to predict
long-term behavior.
Part of the judgement that the sex offenders defined by the Washington
statute are exceptionally dangerous is their propensity to re-offend.159 The
Washington legislature is deliberately targeting, not only sex offenders who
were violent and predatory in the past, but also those who are likely to
commit such acts in the future. It is important to realize that any definition
of dangerousness lacks precision and cannot be totally free of moral or
political judgements." ° Miller and Morris argue that these decisions are
156. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-98. After this forceful condemnation of the crime of rape, the court appears
to miss the point of its own argument by stating that, in contrast to the crime of murder, "[l]ife is over
for the victim of the murderer, for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not
over and normally is not beyond repair." Id. at 598. It is doubtful that most modem commentators on
rape would take such a sunny view of the aftereffects of rape. For example, rape victims report a
syndrome akin to post-traumatic stress disorder experienced by war veterans. Ann Wolbert Burgess &
Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, in FORCIBLE RAPE 315, 324 (Duncan Chappell et al.,
eds., 1977). Effects include: fear of the outdoors, fear of the indoors, fear of being alone, fear of crowds,
fear of people behind them, and sexual fears. Id. at 323-24. The rape victim feels anxious, experiences
loss of self-confidence and self-esteem, paranoia, violent dreams or nightmares. Id. at 326-27. Justice
Powell, in his dissenting opinion in Coker v. Georgia, appears to be more aware of these effects than the
majority; he stated that: "The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than that of the
murderer... there is also a wide variation in the effect on the victim... Some victims are so
grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is beyond repair." Coker, 433 U.S. at 603.
157. Note that if a predator is civilly committed under the statute, they have decided that it is beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is likely to commit future sexually violent crimes. Even a jury which has been
presented with a one-third probability of reoffense as a prediction by the mental health expert will
necessarily have been convinced that together with the other evidence, a very high likelihood of
reoffending was established. This only strengthens the dangerousness analysis under this model.
158. RONALD HOLMES, SEx CRiMES 108 (1991).
159. Research has shown that "the average adolescent sexual offender may be expected to commit 380
sex crimes (this includes lesser offenses, eg, exhibitionism) during his lifetime." Don Riesenberg,
Motivations Studied and Treatments Devised in Attempt to Change Rapists' Behavior, 257 JAMA 899-900
(Feb. 1987). Massachusetts' experience with their sexually dangerous person statute reveals that among
individuals who were singled out among all sex offenders to be evaluated for possible civil commitment,
62% had at least one prior conviction for a sex offense. Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 294-95. Of the
group actually committed, 73% had a prior sex crime record, 47% of which involved force or violence.
Id. at 295. In a study of 260 mentally disordered sex offenders (MDSO's) released from Atascadero State
Hospital in California showed that of the group predicted to still be dangerous upon release (180
offenders), 24% re-offended for a sex crime within five years. Sturgeon, & Taylor, supra note 11, at 31-
64, 54. Twelve percent of the group predicted nondangerous (80 offenders) reoffended for a sex crime
within that period. Id. at 54. However, the two groups were almost identical in their re-offense rate for
nonsexual crimes against the person, and for property crimes. Id. Thus, the staff of Atascadero were
far more accurate at predicting re-offense for sex crimes than they were at predicting re-offense for other
crimes. Id. at 61.
160. HALLECK, supra note 123, at 86.
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morally responsible:
We assume that present predictive capacities will prove to be the best we
have for several decades. Suppose that, even among those with a high risk
of committing a future crime of violence, to be sure of preventing one such
crime, we would have to detain three of those at risk. We submit that it
is still ethically appropriate and socially desirable to take such predictions
into account m many police, prosecutorial, judicial, correctional, and
legislative decisions.'
While the seemingly low level of accuracy of prediction of dangerous-
ness causes critics to reject prediction as unworthy to be considered in the
decision to selectively incapacitate, Miller and Morris point out that given the
relative rarity of violent criminality-a rate of prediction of one in three is
not a low rate of prediction, but actually a very high rate of prediction."
The Washington legislature has the responsibility and the mandate from their
constituents to define dangerousness in a way that maximizes society's safety.
V. ETHICAL AND POLICY CHOICES IN CHOOSING
TO USE PREDICTIONS OF DANGEROUSNESS
The Supreme Court cases almost uniformly adopt a choice of public
safety from recidivists over the individual liberty interests of the detainees.
The critical literature almost universally advocates a greater solicitude for the
individual liberty interest infringed upon. Since it is apparent that the
Constitution has not been interpreted to prevent the use of prediction, then
the rationales for choosing one interest over the other, based upon admittedly
imperfect prediction tools, rest upon other than a purely legal justification.
These choices are based upon the ethical and policy judgements regarding
treatment and the rehabilitative ideal versus punishment for violent offenders.
Opponents of the Sexually Violent Predator statute urge that longer
prison sentences are preferable to indeterminate treatment for sex offend-
ers.1" This is would seem to be an acceptable solution only if one agrees
that (1) sex offenders are not mentally ill, thus they do not require treatment,
(2) treatment for sex offenders does not work, or (3) sex offenders may be
mentally ill, but it is still appropriate to punishment rather than treat them.
A corollary is the notion that sex offenders are not different in any principled
way from other classes of criminals, and therefore singling them out for
treatment when other criminals are punished with incarceration or probation
is unjustifiable. However, it is clear that there are sex offenders who are
primarily disturbed and secondarily offenders; it is this group of offenders
which is targeted by the Washington Sexually Violent Predator statute.
161. Miller & Morris, supra note 45, at 395-96.
162. "[A] group of three people, one of whom within a few months will commit a crime of extreme
personal violence, is a very dangerous group indeed." Id. at 408.
163. Bodine, supra note 6, at 139-41.
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One of the worst consequences of treating disturbed sex offenders as
though they are primarily offenders and secondarily disturbed is these
individuals must then receive mental health services in a prison setting which
seriously undermines the effectiveness of the treatment."z Due to the
general lack of public support for alternatives to prison for disturbed
offenders, some observers express the hope that forensic psychiatry will be
permitted to have a greater role in sentencing, and that programs to divert
disturbed offenders after sentencing can be created."t The involuntary
commitment program used in Washington, while it may be the most
restrictive treatment method for disturbed violent offenders, has the
advantage of giving the offender treatment in a setting which is exclusively
devoted to mental health care, free from penal concerns other than security.
Some might urge that the sex offenders' civil liberties would be better served
by a determinate prison sentence rather than indefinite civil commitment.
Aside from the very serious problems facing the penal system in the United
States today, due to a burgeoning inmate population," it is not true that
a disturbed offender will be best served by being freed into the general
population after a prison term. The Supreme Court recognized this in
Addington v. Texas, stating:
One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of
treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma. It cannot be said,
therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to "go free" than
for a mentally normal person to be committed... [due] process does not
require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate
the possibility of convicting an innocent person. 67
Thus, the very real need of these sex offenders to receive treatment,
even if not always assured of success, cannot be denied. The state's interest
in treating these individuals must be balanced against the individual's liberty
interest. Where the mental disturbance of the individual is accompanied by
likelihood of further sex crimes against others, indefinite commitment seems
to be the best solution.
164. Hans Toch & Kenneth Adams, The Prison as Dumping Ground: Mainlining Disturbed Offenders,
15 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 539, 541 (1987).
165. Id. at 551.
166. The number of sex offenders in U.S. prisons rose from 58,000 to 85,647 between 1988 and 1990;
a 48 percent increase. Rhonda Hillbery, Identifying, Treating Sex Offenders, WASHINGTON POST HEALTH
11, Oct. 22, 1991 (citing CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM). Apparently, 25 to 30 percent of all incarcerated
inmates are actually sex offenders, regardless of the crime for which they were incarcerated. HALLECK,
supra note 123, at 82. However, it has been found that mental health professionals who work with prison
populations believe that incarcerated sex offenders are in fact mentally disturbed and require treatment,
espite the fact that the offender has neither qualified as a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) or
other mentally incapacitated classification. Id. Those who urge stiffer penalties rather than resorting to
civil commitment and treatment should recognize that most rapes are not committed as a simple criminal
act, interchangeable with the motivations of a robber, burglar or mugger. While there is some difference
in expert opinion about the precise classification of rapist type and motivation, it is accepted that "there
are some specific characteristics present in rapists that differentiate them from other criminals." COHEN,
supra note 23, at 296-98.
167. Addingtonv. Texas, 441 U.S. at 429-30 (citations omitted).
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It is unquestionable that if one concentrates on incarceration, the day will
arrive when the prisoner is finished with his sentence and returns to society.
Those who urge more frequent incarceration for hard-core repeat sex
offenders must become aware of the fact that the prison environment in itself
is a "superb breeding ground for mental illness.""u It seems preferable to
treat a mentally ill sex offender by removing, if possible, the source of his
inappropriate violent behavior. Robert Freeman-Longo, head of the sex-
offender unit of the Oregon State Hospital, which is a part of the Oregon
Department of Corrections, states, "[e]very one of these men will be back
in the community within six months to four years and will reoffend without
therapy. If we are not going to lock them up forever, we have an obligation
to treat them.""6 When one recognizes the extremely threatening nature
of the prison environment for the sex offender, segregated treatment for the
sex offender becomes even more desirable." °
It has been argued that treatment for sex offenders is ineffective, and that
therefore, any exercise of police power and parens patriae power to
indefinitely commit the sexually violent predator offender for treatment is
unjustified."' Yet this is generalization too great. According to some
experts, although some sex offenders are more responsive to treatment than
others, we as a society should not give in to urges merely to punish the worst
cases." 7 Rather, since the result of such an impulse will be that the
released offender reemerges untreated to re-offend, we should not be
discouraged into abandoning the attempt to treat the worst offenders. 73
Murray Cohen states "Itihe life-long pathological relationships with women
seen in these ... groups of rapists give no reason to believe that a prison
sentence will make them less dangerous." 74 Society's natural revulsion
against these types of criminals and the consequent reluctance to treat the
168. HALLECK, supra note 123, at 133. Halleck states, "I am never surprised, when visiting a prison
and being asked to interview prisoners described as typical or 'troublemakers,' to discover that they are
blatantly psychotic. Even a minimal empathic inquiry into their mental status reveals what is often
extraordinary pathology." Id. at 134.
169. Reisenberg, supra note 159, at 899-900.
170. A separate treatment facility like the Washington center at Monroe is certainly safer for the sex
offender than a prison, where he -an inevitably expect victimization. For example, during a 1980 prison
riot in the Penitentiary of New Mexico the prisoners stormed the protective custody unit where sex
offenders were housed, using blowtorches to burn their way in. Most of the sex offender inmates were
brutally killed with methods which included extreme mutilation and torture. John Monahan & Sharon
Kantorowski Davis, Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS, 196-197
(John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, eds. 1983) (citing M. Serrill & P. Katel, New Mexico: Anatomy
of a Riot, 6 CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE 12-13 (1980)). There is an hierarchy of offenders within prisons,
which is: 1) robber, 2) drug offender, 3) murderer, 4) burglar, 5) assaultive offender, 6) thief, 7)
murderer-rapist, 8) rapist, 9) incest offender, 10) pedophile. RONALD M. HOLMES, SEX CRIMES 110
(1991) (citing Vaughn, et al., Less than Utopian: Sex Offender Treatment in a Milieu of Power Struggles,
Status Positioning, and Inmate Manipulations in State Correctional Institutions, 69(2) PRISON J. 73-89
(1989)).
171. See Bodine, supra note 6, at 120, 121.
172. W. L. Marshall & A. Eccles, Issues in Clinical Practice with Sex Offenders, 6 J. OF INTERPERSON-
AL VIOLENCE 68, 83 (1991).
173. Id.
174. Cohen, supra note 23, at 313.
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offenders is thought to be the biggest obstacle to actually preventing sexual
assaults "at the source-the known or admitted sex offender." 175
It will be beneficial to understanding why predictions of dangerousness
are justified to identify sex offenders who are sexually violent predators if we
reject the belief that punishment, not treatment, is the appropriate response
to sexual predators. The people of Washington, through their legislature,
have clearly indicated that they desire sex predators removed from the
population until they are rehabilitated, in order to avoid the horrifying result
of prison-without-treatment which was illustrated by Earl Shriner's heinous
offense.
What ends will be served by punishing a sex offender who has been
found to be a sexually violent predator? The traditional purposes of
punishment are retribution, general deterrence, individual prevention,
including incapacitation and rehabilitation. 76 Retribution has been called
the "ultimate purpose of punishment."" It follows from the central
premise of retribution that individuals are free agents capable of voluntary
choice, that persons should not suffer punishment unless they are blamewor-
thy.'78 Punishment is only proper where the offender can be blamed for
failure to make a correct choice in acting.' H.L.A. Hart, one of the
foremost theorists regarding crime and punishment, argues that retribu-
tion "could rest on the simple idea that unless a man has the capacity and a
fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behavior to the law its penalties ought
not to be applied to him."'10 It is difficult to perceive how the sexual
predator is to be expected to have a "fair opportunity to adjust his behavior
to the law" without treatment. Despite admittedly low success rates with
some kinds of sex offender treatment (which was expressly acknowledged in
the preamble to the Washington statute),' there is no reason to suppose
175. Gene G. Abel et al., Behavioral Approaches to Treatment of the Violent Sex Offender, in CLINICAL
TREATMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON 95, 116 (Loren Roth, ed. 1987).
176. PETER W. LOW ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW I (2d ed. 1986).
177. Id. at 4.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 5.
180. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 180-83 (1968).
181. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1975 & 1991 Supp.).
There are a variety of methods used to treat mentally disordered sex offenders. David Weston,
superintendent of the new sexually violent predator treatment center at the Washington state prison, states
that treatment for the predators will consist of individual and group therapy with a staff psychologist and
social workers. Robb London, Strategy on Sex Crimes is Prison, then Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1991.
They intend to aid the predators through "classic behavior modification" to cause them to associate their
deviant sexual fantasies with negative thoughts. Id. It can be argued that imprisonment for a mentally
disordered sex offender is even less moral response than indefinite treatment programs which might
include drug therapy. Seymour Halleck, in his landmark study of mentally ill offenders for the National
Institute of Health, argues:
It is legitimate to inquire whether forcing offenders to endure the pain, degradation, and
suffering associated with spending 10, 20, or 30 years in prison is any less morally
reprehensible than allowing offenders to submit to operations or to take drugs that would
allow them to lead a life with certain limitations but in a free and relatively safe community.
Civil libertarians might argue that prison is preferable, but it is unlikely that most offenders,
if given full information about all options, would agree.
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prison also will not magically remove the offenders' deviant impulses.
Another primary goal of punishment is incapacitation of the offender,
which will prevent any crime from being committed against society at large
during the prison term. Professor Herbert Packer expresses the following
view in The Limits of the Criminal Sanction:
The case for incapacitation is strongest... where the offender is least
capable of controlling himself, where his conduct bears the least resem-
blance to the kind of purposeful, voluntary conduct to which we are likely
to attach moral condemnation. Baldly put, the incapacitative theory is at
its strongest for those who, in retributive terms, are least deserving of
punishment. 12
Washington and states still retaining "sexual psychopath"-type stat-
utes"s are expressing their conviction that, from a legal point of view,
certain types of sex offenders are less blameworthy because they are less
capable of exercising self control. The justification for incapacitation under
Packer's analysis is very strong for these uncontrolled, impulsive sex
offenders; they are "least deserving of punishment."
Society's moral outrage against the rapist or child molester also seems
void of any understanding of the abusive, dysfunctional life experiences
suffered by many sexually violent predators." It cannot be overlooked
that most sex offenders were abused children. One study of incarcerated sex
offenders found that 80% of the offenders reported being sexually abused in
their childhood.s Packer uses the example of kleptomania as one present-
ing a strong case for incapacitation but a weak case for retribution, because
of the kleptomaniac's abnormally strong impulse to steal. Moral outrage
seems to be the basis for advocating punishment of a sexually violent
predator, but not the kleptomaniac; yet the "abnormally strong impulse" to
offend is present in both.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the use of psychiatric and
other professional predictions of dangerousness, despite its perceived
inaccuracy. The real objections to the use of predictions stem from an
ethical judgement about individual liberty versus crime control.
Retributivism, if followed strictly, cannot justify detention of persons where
HALLECK, supra note 123, at 180.
182. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRMINAL SANCTION 50-51 (1968).
183. Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Jersey, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington retain sex offender commitments
statutes.
184. For an excellent illustration of how an abusive and dysfunctional childhood can create a sexually
predatory adult sex offender, see JACK OLSEN, PREDATOR (1992).
185. J. Wassermann, et al., Adolescent Sex Offenders, 255 JAMA 181-182 (Jan. 1986) (citing A.
Nicholas Groth, Rapists and Child Molesters, Conference presentation, Burlington, Vt. 1985.)
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the risk is great that the detainee is a "false positive." Utilitarians, on the
other hand, would have no ethical difficulty detaining even these "false
positives," provided the result was an overall reduction in violent sex
offenses.
The Supreme Court has, in recent years, appeared to favor the utilitarian
view of crime control, based upon conservative values regarding individual
liberty and the practical reality of burgeoning crime. The tremendous
increase in sex offenses coupled with the grave effects of sex crimes on the
victims of these offenses-generally women and children, certainly justify
renewed efforts by states such as Washington to craft new legislation to deal
with this terrible social evil. The alternative to statutes such as the
Washington Sexual Predator law is to continue to merely punish all sex
offenders with incarceration, which does nothing for the mentally ill offender
and clearly poses an unacceptable risk to society. When such statutes are
narrowly drawn to address only the worst of the worst offenders, as is the
Washington Sexual Predator civil commitment scheme, then it seems to be
morally responsible, as well as constitutionally permissible, for states to
restrain the offender's liberty based upon predictions of future behavior.
Marie A. Bochnewich*
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